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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the origins of the currency and maturity mismatches in the 
balance sheets of emerging countries.  
We show that short term debt under the form of demandable debt works as a commitment 
device of the financial intermediary and as a form of protection of foreign lenders in a context of 
poor enforceability of contracts. 
The currency mismatch in the non tradable sector is mainly viewed as a supply-side 
phenomenon. It results from the choice of foreign lenders whose anticipations of exchange rate 
risk overpass those of default of the banking and/or private sector following a real adverse 
shock.  
Finally, when it comes to simultaneously explain the maturity and the currency composition of 
debt, the paper puts into light that the short term foreign currency denominated debt allows 
investors to offset the debtor default risk in case of depreciation by the option of early 
withdrawal of the demandable debt. 
 
JEL Classification: F31, F32, F34, G15, G21. 
Keywords: maturity mismatch, currency mismatch, real exchange rate, international financial 
crises.  
 
Introduction 
 
It was long thought that the financial liberalization was undeniably good both for countries 
adopting it and the world economy as a whole. Higher investment and growth, better saving 
allocation at international level or better response to external shocks are often brought forward 
in favour of financial liberalization. Moreover, the international capital mobility was part of the 
reforms the IMF advocated at the time of the Washington Consensus (1989) for the financial 
integration of the emergent markets. This strategy attracted large capital inflows in the emerging 
countries. The rapid process of financial liberalization and financial market deregulation as well 
as the development of new financial instruments during the 90s set the stage of the capital 
inflows while fixed exchange rate arrangements gave an illusion of stability to foreign investors.  
 Nevertheless, starting with the second half of the 1980s, authors like Diaz-Alejandro 
(1985) have already warned on the risks of financial liberalization in presence of poor 
regulation. In his seminal paper, he refers to the Chilean crisis of 1981-83 with the aim of 
illustrating the dangers of the financial reforms in a context of fixed exchange rate regimes, 
international capital mobility, implicit bailout guarantees and weak regulation and supervision.  
 The notion of financial liberalization at all costs was called into question when series of 
capital account reforms were followed by abrupt financial and currency crises. 
 Among the features of the new breed of crises which took place in the 1990s, the 
maturity and currency mismatches were seen by scholars of the Asian crisis as the major 
ingredients of the capital flows instability in emerging countries. 
 The maturity mismatch was associated to a boom period in international lending in the 
1990s. The outstanding stock of debt of emerging-market economies roughly doubled between 
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1988 and 1997, from $1 trillion to $2 trillion1 (Rodrik and Velasco (1999)). While medium and 
long- term debt grew rapidly as well, it was short term debt that rose particularly rapidly during 
this period. According to the BIS, prior to the Asian crisis, about 60% of the overall claims of 
the foreign lenders become due within a year2.  
 As for the currency mismatch, this refers to a situation in which some of the domestic 
debt and all the external debt of the emerging countries was denominated in foreign currencies 
without hedging of the exchange rate risk. This situation was called liabilities dollarization by 
Calvo (1998). 
 Nevertheless, in spite of a unanimous agreement on the adverse effects of short term 
currency denominated debt, the causes of this phenomenon were given little attention.  The 
maturity and currency mismatches are often explained by structural, cyclic or institutional 
factors on the supply as well as on the demand side of international credit.  
However, some questions arise.  
What are the incentives of both domestic borrowers and foreign lenders to choose at 
equiulibrium short term debt denominated in foreign currency as the unique solution on the 
international credit market?  
Why do domestic banks and large firms rely mainly on short term debt in spite of the risks 
implied by this form of financing? 
 Why foreign lenders deny all forms of long term lending to emerging markets and prefer short 
term lending at equilibrium? 
 In order to deal with such topics it is necessary to imagine the game of lenders and borrowers in 
the international context. This is an unavoidable stage because the understanding of incentives 
and constraints of different actors has major consequences in terms of international financial 
architecture.  According to Jeanne (2000), it is difficult to assess the relative merits of these 
reforms without understanding why mismatches arise in the balance sheet of emerging 
countries.  
 The aim of this paper is to highlight the origins of the currency and maturity mismatches 
in the balance sheets of emerging countries. The first section presents a brief overview of the 
literature to which this paper is related while the second section draws the general setting of the 
model and its main hypotheses. The third section focuses on the choice of the debt financial 
structure in emerging economies that is short term versus long term debt. The next section deals 
with the choice of its currency composition that is domestic versus foreign currency 
denominated debt. Finally, in the fifth part, we study the simultaneous choice of maturity and 
currency composition of the international debt taking into account the previous results as well as 
the risks incurred by the actors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 The group covers 10 countries in Latin America, 8 in Asia, 8 in Europe, and 11 in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
2 The BIS definition is based on the time to maturity, whereas World Bank (Global Development Finance 
-2000) uses the concept of original maturity of debt. According to the latter criterion, roughly 50% of 
foreign claims on the emerging countries have the original maturity under a year.   
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Section 1: Links to the Literature 
 
 The maturity mismatch and the endogenous financial structure were first studied in the 
context of the domestic credit market. (Jensen (1980), Diamond (1984), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1987), Fama (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Rey and 
Stiglitz (1994)).These authors showed that banks have a competitive advantage in resource 
allocation for investment, which entitles them to go against small uninformed depositors. 
Therefore, demandable debt provides depositors with the option of withdrawing their money any 
time and becomes part of an incentive scheme intended to discipline the financial intermediary.  
 The alternative view on the role of demandable debt is that of Bryant (1980), Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1987). According to them, demand deposits provide flexibility 
to depositors who are uncertain about their demand for liquidity.  
 At the international level, short term debt was seen as the optimal outcome for both 
lenders and borrowers (Jeanne (1998, 2000) and Kashyap (1999)) or as a way of disciplining the 
bank and preventing it from extracting rents on depositors. (Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001)).  
 The currency mismatch was first looked into in the context of the literature on the 
currency composition of sovereign debt. (Cooper (1971), Calvo (1998), Miskhin (1996, 1999)). 
Authors like Bohn (1990), Falcetti et Missale (1999) and Jeanne (1999) endogeneized it as a 
solution to an incentive and commitment problem of the debtor Government.  Alternatively, 
there are few analyses of the private foreign currency debt. Jeanne (1999) shows that foreign 
currency debt works as a commitment device of the domestic borrowers vis- à- vis their foreign 
lenders. Furthermore, he argues that foreign currency debt signals that the borrower does not 
need the cushion provided by domestic currency debt whether a crisis occurs (Jeanne (1999 b)).  
 Furthermore, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) developped a third generation 
model and showed that firms may find it optimal to contract short term debt if the probability of 
crisis is strictly positive. For Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000, 2001 b) foreign currency debt 
implies a situation of underinsurance against systemic shocks.  
 More recently, the maturity and currency mismatches  were seen as the direct 
consequence of the "original sin" of emerging countries, that is an inability to rise long-term 
capital, in domestic currency, on the international market (Chamon and Haussman (2002), 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Pannizza (2002), Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002)). 
 
 
 Section 2: General Setting and Main Hypotheses 
 
Consider a small economy, open to international financial inflows and outflows. This 
economy lasts for two periods, namely the short term (from t=0 to t=1) and the long term (from 
t=1 to t=2). The model is typical of an emerging economy and subsequently it focuses mainly on 
two markets: the domestic credit market and the international one. 
The economy is made out of four types of economic actors (the entrepreneurs in the two sectors, 
the domestic financial intermediary, the foreign lenders and the government which also plays 
the role of the central bank) and of two sectors, namely: 
! The tradable sector composed of firms whose output consists in a single good traded 
internationally;   
! The non tradable sector made of firms which sell their output on the domestic market.  
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We denote by χ and (1- χ) the respective weight of the tradable and the non tradable sector in 
the economy.  
 Let us define the real equilibrium exchange rate (ε) as the relative price of tradable to 
non tradable goods:  
   
N
T
p
pe *⋅
=ε                                                                                              (1) 
where e denotes the nominal exchange rate, pN  is the domestic price of non tradable goods and 
pT* denotes the world price of tradable goods. We suppose that the price of tradable goods is 
exogenous and normalised to unity (pT*=1). Under fixed exchange rates, the nominal exchange 
rate is also constant and normalized to unity, that is e =1.  
 We assume that the firms in the tradable sector are not large enough to affect the interest 
rates or other prices at international level. Therefore the firms act as price takers in all markets.  
 The demand for non tradable goods is decreasing with the real exchange rate and prone 
to shocks. By this hypothesis we introduce in the model the possibility of a real adverse shock.  
 The Government has a loss function which can be written as follows: 
  L = φξ Λ+⋅ )p-(p                                                                                                 (2) 
where 
 ( )p-p  is the gap between the current price and the price at equilibrium of the real exchange 
rate (that is when 1=⋅== *pepp TTN and ε = 1). The price index (p) is computed as the 
weighted average of price levels in the two sectors of the economy, that is: 
  p = χ e pT * + (1-χ) pN                                                                                                                                      (3) 
At equilibrium of the real exchange rate, the price index is p = 1.  
Λ is the political cost of the government loss of credibility in case of abandon of fixed exchange 
rates.   
φ is a dummy which takes two values, namely φ = {0, 1} where 
 φ = 1 means that fixed parity is abandoned which furthermore implies an additional 
 cost to the Government (Λ, the political cost previous defined) and 
 φ = 0 implies that there is no regime switch and no additional cost to the Government 
 loss function.  
ξ is the coefficient reflecting the importance of the inflation in the Government loss function.  
 Tradable producing firms have direct free access to the international credit market 
whereas non tradable producing firms depend on the domestic banks to finance their investment 
projects (cf. Schneider and Tornell (1999)3).  
 Foreign lenders are risk neutral and their placements in the emerging economy may take the 
form of short term debt (demandable debt or credit lines with rollover), long term debt or equity 
investment in banks and domestic firms.  
                                                
3 Schneider and Tornell (1999) revealed the asymmetric performance and the asymmetric financing of 
the tradable and non tradable sectors. According to these authors, the non tradable sector experienced a 
more rapid growth during the boom period but it was the hardest hit by the crisis and recovered more 
slowly in the aftermath of the crisis.  Furthermore, most part of the credits was directed to the non 
tradable sector and therefore banking sector difficulties often originated in the non tradable sector 
financing.  
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 The entrepreneur of the non tradable sector is required to pay off a positive amount C > 1 
at date t which varies according to the underlying risks. Let us denote the revenues for different 
combinations of maturity and currency by .~~~~ *2D2D*1D1D r  ,r  ,r,r  
 It is worth noticing that the domestic bank has a central position as go between foreign 
lenders and non tradable producing firms because of its monopoly power over the 
intermediation relationship.  
 The non tradable sector entrepreneur participates only with his specific skills to the 
project. The investment requires, apart from human capital, a specific non tradable input (real 
estate, for instance) and is financed by the domestic bank.  
 The project of the domestic firm requires one unit of non tradable good at date t=0. The 
investment project may turn out to be early (yielding an amount of R at t=1) or late (illiquid 
at date t=1 and yielding R at t=2).  Initially, the project type isnt known by either lenders or 
borrowers and it is revealed in t=1 only to the latter. Let α be the probability, in t = 0, that the 
project wil be late.  
The probability distribution of project cash flows may be written as follows: 
t=0                                           t=1                             t=2 
Initial expenditure                  cash flows 1               cash flows 2                  
            -1                                     



,  C
   ,   0
                   



)-y(1probabilit the   with,  
  y probabilit the   with,  C
α
α
0
               (4)  
and we assume that the cash flows of early projects at t = 1 can not cover the initial expenditure, 
that is (C(1-α)<1)). 
 The contract between the bank and the non tradable sector firm is akin to a standard debt 
contract stipulating  that the debtor undertakes to pay off a strictly positive amount C  at date t  
(t = 1, 2). Should the opposite occur the bank takes possession of the firm and is free to liquidate 
the investment project. Let us denote by r < 1 the liquidation value in t = 1 of a project requiring 
one unit of initial expense.    
 The bank is free to replace the initial entrepreneur by another one who possesses the 
same technical skills. The schedule of repayments is unchanged; nevertheless, as the original 
entrepreneur was particularly suited for the strategy, the project new cash flows will be smaller, 
of only γC, with 0 < γ <1 (for a gross return of C in presence of the original entrepreneur).    
 A last hypothesis deals with the private contracts enforcement. The regulation is weak, 
there is no investors protection and contracts may be renegotiated midway4 (enforceability 
problems). Therefore contracts lack temporal coherence in the sense that debtors may be led to 
reconsider the terms of the contract at an intermediary stage. Contracts are thus characterized by 
a soft budgetary constraint due to the weak regulation and inefficient bankruptcy laws. 
 In the next section we focus on the optimal structure of banks and tradable producing-
firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 The bank can, for example, announce incomes lower than those effectively earned. 
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Section 3: The Choice of the Financial Structure 
(Short Term versus Long Term) 
 
In this section the currency in which international debt is denominated is left aside.  Since 
the choice of the financial structure is similar in the two sectors of the economy, we disregard 
whether debtors are from the tradable or from the non tradable sector. In the tradable sector, the 
equivalent for demand deposits of the non tradable sector is the rollover on the interbank 
market. Actually, tradable sector producing firms borrow from foreign banks on the 
international financial market. Therefore we study the relationship between the firm, the 
domestic bank and the foreign lenders, in order to highlight the optimal financial structure of 
domestic borrowers.  
 
3.1. The Bargaining of the Bank and the Domestic Firm 
 
 Since the domestic entrepreneur has not an initial endowment, his participation to the 
investment project consists solely in his personal skills. At date t=0 his investment opportunity 
requires a quantity of one non tradable good and he addresses the domestic bank in order to get 
a credit. The amount and the schedule of project cash-flows are given by the relation (4). At the 
time of the conclusion of the contract neither part knows the "type" of the project that may be a 
premature, liquid project at t =1 or a late one, illiquid in the short run and yielding R at the end 
of two periods. This information will be revealed only in t = 1 and will be known only by the 
entrepreneur.  
 Under the soft budgetary constraint the repayment that the borrower is required to make 
to the bank is fixed trough bargaining between the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary.  
At any time of their relationship, the borrower may attempt to renegotiate the initial terms of the 
contract using the threat of leaving the project. By doing so, he knows that the bank will lose, 
even if it replaces him by another entrepreneur. According to our previous assumptions, the 
bank gets only γC (with 0 < γ < 1) by replacing the initial entrepreneur. Therefore, at project 
maturity, the entrepreneur makes a repayment of exactly γC to the bank which accepts it because 
it could not have better if it replaces him.  
 The state contingent contract (through the transfer of control rights to the bank in case of 
default) is like an option of equity investment bought by the bank on the firms capital. It helps 
somehow to solve the information asymmetry between the concluding parties.  The domestic 
bank has a monopoly on the initial entrepreneur and no other bank could do the same. 
Therefore, the bank has specific skills in collecting resources which give her bargaining power 
in the relationship with the domestic borrower as well as with the foreign lenders, on the 
international financial market.  
Result 1: The firms retained earnings on the project are equal to the opportunity cost of its 
replacement by the bank. Therefore, the banks return is R≡ (1-γ)C, with 0 < γ < 1.  
     
 
3.2. The Bargaining of the Domestic Bank and the Foreign Lenders 
 
The contract between domestic bank and foreign lenders may take the following forms:  
• Simple non liquidating contract, equivalent to a long term debt contract (due in t=2)  
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according to which the borrower cannot withdraw his money at an intermediary stage without 
incurring penalties.  Should bank liquidation occur, such (senior) claimants are reimbursed after 
demandable depositors are paid off.    
• Simple liquidating contract equivalent to standard demandable-debt contract, according  
to which the creditor receives the due payment at any moment of their relationship. In case of 
bank run, demand depositors are paid according to their position in the line.   
• Equity investment contract in the bank capital, which allows for a proportion of the  
project total return at maturity. In case of liquidation, such a claimant is paid after bank 
customers and short term claimants.  
 In what follows we do not distinguish between long term debt and equity investment 
since in the context of a two-period model they both represent long term obligations. Instead, we 
focus on the choice of short term debt versus long term debt in the financial structure of the 
domestic bank and the tradable producing- firm.  
 The financial intermediary has acquired specific collecting skills along its relationships 
with domestic entrepreneurs. In the same way a particular entrepreneur could threaten to 
withdraw his human capital, the bank can renegotiate, at an intermediate stage (at t =1) the 
contract concluded with its foreign lenders. In a context of poor enforceability of contracts, the 
bank may especially announce, at t=1, future payments at the end of the second period inferior 
to those initially promised to the lenders. 
 As for the representative lender, we suppose that his potential withdrawal is motivated 
solely by the expectation of poor performance of the domestic bank and not by liquidity needs at 
an intermediary stage.  
The players taking part in the dynamic game are: 
• the foreign lenders, who have two strategies available at t = 0 namely {short term lending; 
long term lending} and {withdraw; not withdraw} at t = 1; 
• the domestic bank which has two strategies available at t = 1, namely {renegotiate debt 
contracts; respect debt contracts}. 
The order of decisions can be represented as follows: 
Let us reason by backward induction. Foreign lenders play last, at t = 1, by choosing to 
withdraw or to keep the invested funds until t =2, according to the bank expected behaviour and 
their future payment at the end of the second period. First, consider the long term debt. Should 
depositors withdraw at an intermediary stage, they undergo a loss connected to the late projects 
t = 0                     t = 1                 t = 2 
 
 
-  Lenders choose between ST/LT          - The bank renegotiates the                    (second  
according to their anticipations               contracts and modify the                         period  
of future payment by the bank ;              payments of long term depositors;          payoffs) 
-  The domestic bank announces   
the future payments of  demandable       - Possible withdrawal of depositors; 
debt (that is the initial expenditure)  
and long term deposits                                    ( first period payoffs). 
(that is r2 >1 at t = 2) ;             
- The bank lends the collected funds 
to firms in the non tradable sector. 
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liquidation. Suppose that their payoff is r < 1 in the case of early withdrawal compared with r2 
>1 which represents their payoff at the end of two periods.  
 Suppose that the bank attempts to modify, at t = 1, the amount of cash flow rights, their 
schedule or to take any other action against the foreign lenders interests. 
Whenever lenders have long term claims on the domestic bank, in case of liquidation, they can 
seize the bank assets but they become in turn responsible for the repayment of junior claims 
(demandable debt, for instance). Investors miss specific collection skills and the bank knows 
that, in its absence, their returns would go to zero. Therefore, the bank will propose payoffs 
lower that those previously announced at t = 0 and that means an additional profit (denoted by 
µ) of the bank on the revenues of foreign lenders.  
 Conversely, let us analyse the case for the demand deposits. Lenders can withdraw their 
funds at any moment (at t = 1 or t = 2) without penalty. Whenever the bank decides to 
renegotiate the contracts and modify second period payments, lenders may trigger an efficient 
bank run5 at t = 1 leading to the liquidation of late projects and future production losses.  
 The bank decides to renegotiate, at t = 1, the ongoing contracts according to the type of 
contract chosen by depositors. The amount paid off to depositors at the end of the second period 
must be at least equal to that obtained in case of early withdrawal at t= 1 so that depositors keep 
the funds with the bank following renegotiation. Precisely, in the case of demandable debt, the 
bank is constrained by early withdrawal to pay out at the end of the second period the amount 
announced in the beginning (that is µ* = 0). Conversely, the new payoffs of long term 
depositors (that is R(1-µ), where µ  represents the additional bank profit at the end of two 
periods) may go down to the liquidation value (r < 1) in case of early withdrawal at an 
intermediary stage: 
   r2 (1-µ*) ≥  r                                                                                             (5) 
where we assumed a discount rate equal to unity.  
The maximal rent extracted by the bank on the depositors revenues can thus be written: 
   µ* = 1- r2 /R,                            (6) 
where 0 < µ < 1.   
 Initially (at t = 0), the representative lender chooses his deposit maturity according to the 
expected behaviour of the domestic bank at t = 1. As we have just seen above, whenever he 
chooses demandable debt, the bank commits itself not to alter the second period revenues. 
Therefore, the depositor decides to keep his funds with the bank till the end of the second 
period. Alternatively, whenever the depositor lends long term, the bank cannot commit not to 
renegotiate the contract to its profit. According to the relation (6) here above, the depositors 
payoff is r <1 whenever he withdraws at t= 1 or wait for two periods.  
 Demandable debt is thus strictly preferred by foreign lenders as it solves the conflict of 
interests between bank and depositors in presence of uncertainty on the bank future 
performance. The right of demand depositors to withdraw at any period the funds previously 
invested whenever they have doubts on their long term repayment implicitly transform them into 
                                                
5 Such bank run driven by the fear of poor performance anticipated by the informed depositors is often 
referred to as fundamental bank run (see Gorton (1985) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988)) unlike 
speculative bank runs (Bryant (1980), Diamond& Dybvig (1983)). 
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monitors of the bank. Under these circumstances, the bank can commit itself to pass onto 
depositors whatever it collects from the entrepreneurs without renegotiate the contracts.   
 Therefore, short term debt enables the bank to ex-ante commit to a set of payoffs that it 
would not be able to provide to depositors having ordinary debt. Demandable debt becomes thus 
a discipline device of the financial intermediary and a form of protection of foreign lenders in a 
context of poor enforceability of contracts. 
   
Let us compute the fraction of late projects that the bank have to liquidate at t = 1 in order to pay 
out the early withdrawal of short term lenders. In the light of the Result 1, banks revenues from 
the investment projects can be written as follows: 
t=0                                        t=1                        t=2 
            -1                            



,R
,
  
      0
                   



)-(1y probabilit    with,  
  y probabilit   with,  R
α
α
0
                            (7) 
whereβ, the percentage of late projects liquidated at an intermediary stage, is given by the 
following equation: 
  1 = (1-α)R + βα r → β = 1
r
R)(
⋅
−
α
α1 -                                                                (8) 
where 0 < β< 1.  
Result 2: The optimal form of financing for both lenders and borrowers in a context of poor 
enforceability of contracts is the demandable debt.   
The previous analysis brings out the fact that short term debt is the equilibrium solution of the 
game between lenders and borrowers in a context of poor enforceability of contracts. The nature 
of the sequential service (according to which depositors are repaid on a first come, first served 
basis) creates a collective action which forces the domestic borrower to fully respect its 
obligations.  
 By taking on demandable debt, the domestic bank commits itself not to expropriate the 
foreign lenders and therefore signals the good quality of its projects. As for the foreign lenders, 
they know that domestic borrowers, who finance themselves by short term debt, are exposed to 
the risk of early liquidation of their projects in case of bank run. Therefore, the risk premium 
required by the foreign investors on their short term lending to emerging countries was 
particularly low ex ante. But, at the same time, the term structure of interest rates depends also 
on the risk associated to different debt maturities. This implies that borrowers who take on 
excessively short term debt become more vulnerable to liquidity crises. Therefore, short term 
debt proves to be riskier and more expensive ex post, in case of a run by foreign investors. 
Uncertainty on the quality of the bank assets may trigger a bank run on the depositors side. 
Therefore such panic keeps the bank out of the intermediation relationship and therefore induces 
an ever more marked decline in the assets value. 
 Along the 1990s, there were also some market imperfections as well as factors connected 
to the international context which encouraged short term lending to emerging countries. We can 
generally distinguish aggravating factors on the demand side (for instance the rapid financial 
deregulation giving domestic borrowers easy access to international capital markets; financial 
liberalisation in emerging markets not accompanied by adequate regulation and prudential 
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supervision; the taxation of international flows favourable to short term capital movements) as 
well on the supply side (the growth of broad money in industrial countries6, the decline in short  
term interest rates, the presence of implicit or explicit government guarantees which created 
moral hazard; BRI7 rules concerning international credit).  
 In our vision, the maturity mismatch in balance sheets of emerging markets is a supply-
induced phenomenon mainly due to the weak regulatory environment of the emerging countries 
prior to crises.  
 Short term debt represented the unique solution for foreign investors who were not 
protected by domestic regulations. It could be viewed as a form of self-protection (although 
imperfect) of foreign lenders in order to offset the insufficiency of the regulatory framework in 
emerging countries. 
  
  
Section 4: The Choice of the Currency Composition of Debt 
(Foreign versus Domestic Currency) 
 
 In this section we focus on the currency mismatch in balance sheet of emerging 
countries. We aim at explaining why banks and large firms in emerging markets took on large 
currency denominated debt whereas, on the assets aside, these funds financed domestic 
investment projects. Like the short term borrowing, foreign currency denominated debt is less 
costly ex ante but generally proves to be riskier and more expensive ex post. The borrowers are 
exposed to the exchange risk whether their revenues are in domestic currency. Furthermore, 
even though it is not a direct consequence, the currency mismatch implicitly holds a significant 
credit risk whenever banks' credit to domestic firms is also denominate in foreign currency. 
Unless they are net exporters, in case of depreciation, the bank undergoes an exchange rate risk 
as well as a credit risk and therefore it will be unable to pay off its debts to foreign lenders. 
 As the foreign debt of the tradable producing firms doesnt imply a currency mismatch, 
we focus on the non tradable sector financing. It is worth noticing that, unlike the tradable sector 
financing, the foreign currency denominated debt of domestic banks is not justified by the 
anticipation of a currency crisis and the subsequent devaluation of the domestic currency. 
Indeed, the depreciation has a strong adverse effect on the domestic currency valuation of bank 
debt denominated in foreign currency. Therefore, banks would be unable to meet their 
obligations whose value increases in domestic terms.  
    
4.1. The currency composition of the non tradable sector debt  
 
  It is worth noticing that unlike the tradable sector financing, it is not the perspective of a 
balance of payment crisis and the underlying devaluation which encouraged foreign currency 
                                                
6 The annual rate of progression of wide aggregates in industrial countries (United States, Japan, United 
Kingdom and Euro Zone) which had fallen to 2,5 % at the end of 1994 exceeded 6 % at the beginning of 
1996, whereas short-term interest rates lost 1 % over the same period (68-th Annual report of the 
BRI,1998).  
7 Minimum capital adequacy ratio is established at 20 % in the case of short-term loans to non OECD 
countries compared with 100% of credits with a maturity superior to the year. 
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denominated debt of domestic banks. In such a case, the latter would be unable to pay off their 
foreign debt as its value, in domestic terms, would be superior to that under fixed exchange 
rates.  
 Let us identify the risks associate with each type of loan. The results are summarized in 
table 1 below: 
 
Foreign Lender deposits with the domestic bank  Domestic bank lending to the non tradable sector 
firm 
Domestic currency 
denominated debt (D) 
Foreign currency 
denominated debt  (D*) 
Domestic currency 
denominated debt (D) 
Foreign currency 
denominated debt  (D*) 
Exchange rate risk in 
case of nominal 
devaluation ( e~ ). 
 
 
Bank default risk in 
case of nominal 
devaluation (φ~ ) ; 
No exchange rate risk.  
(maturity mismatch)       
Neither exchange rate 
risk nor default risk 
induced by the 
nominal exchange 
rate variation.  
Default risk of the domestic 
firm in case of nominal 
devaluation ; 
No exchange rate risk.  
(maturity mismatch) 
Table 1 
In the present section we do not take into account the maturity of the foreign lending to the 
emerging country. The Government intervention in the economy is made through the nominal 
exchange rate following a trade-off between the abandon and the defence of fixed parity.  
The order of decisions is illustrated below: 
 
 
Consider the realisation, during the first period, of an exogenous adverse shock affecting the 
terms of trade. Accordingly, the demand of non tradable goods rises, leading to an increase in 
their price and to a real appreciation of the currency (relation (1)). Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime (e = 1), since  pT*=1, the shock on the terms of trade shows through the price level of 
non tradable goods ( Np~ ). Furthermore, assume that Np~  is a continuos random variable 
following an uniform distribution on [1, a], where a denotes the upper bound of the price of non 
tradable goods.  
t = 0                      t = 1              t = 2 
 
 
-  The lender chooses                             - the Government decides     (second period 
between D and D*               adverse demand       to devaluate according to      payoffs)           
according to the expected    shock leading to a    the expected consequences    
nominal exchange rate ;       real appreciation      of the real adverse shock on  
- The bank announces          of the currency         firms in tradable and non  
the depositors future           with a probability     tradable sectors ;     
payments according to                  of π.                           
their currency denomination ;                               (first period payoffs)                                     
                                                                                            
- the real exchange rate is   
at equilibrium, that is ε = 1.  
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 The Government makes a trade-off between the costs of maintaining the fixed exchange 
rate and those of abandoning it. The adoption of a flexible arrangement following the adverse 
real shock allows for the equilibrium of the real exchange rate and preserves the external 
competitiveness of the economy. Conversely, according to the relation (3), inflation rises and, in 
addition to that, the Central Bank has to bear a political cost of abandoning the peg which is a 
cost of credibility loss on the financial market.   
 The Government overlooks the repercussions of a nominal devaluation on the stability of 
the domestic banking sector. His decision motivated by the protection of the private sector 
affects the overall financing capacity of the banking sector and therefore the production level of 
the private sector (balance sheet effects).  
 More precisely, the Government decides to abandon fixed exchange rate (and to undergo 
nominal depreciation) following an adverse real shock when the loss under fixed rates is equal 
to the loss under flexible exchange rates. Let us write the loss function in these two distinct 
cases as a function of the price of non tradable goods. (
ε
1
=Np ).  
Under fixed exchange rates, the government loss function can be written as follows: 
   L1  )p-(p⋅= ξ                                                           (9) 
where  
   p =1 and p = χ e pT * + (1-χ) pN                                                                                             (4) 
The previous relation thus becomes: 
  L1 ( ) )p()(p)( 1)-(p  )p-(p NN 1111 −⋅−⋅=−⋅−+⋅=⋅=⋅= χξχχξξξ        (10)                                  
Under flexible exchange rates, the nominal exchange rate (e) offsets the real appreciation of the 
currency, which implies e= pN  so that ε =1. Let us write the government loss function taking 
into account the political cost of credibility:  
   L2 = Λ+⋅   )p-(pξ                          (11) 
where p =1 and  p = χ e pT * + (1-χ) pN = χ pN + (1-χ) pN = 1  
which finally enables us to write: 
   L2 = Λ                                      (12) 
 To sum up, the government abandons the peg, following the adverse shock, whenever 
the price of non tradable goods is above a threshold, denoted by pN *, where: 
   1
1
1 >
−⋅
Λ
+=
)(
*pN χξ
                       (13)  
which implies the following condition for the exchange rate: 
ε < 1
1
1
<
Λ+−⋅
−⋅
=
)(
)(*
χξ
χξε                                                                      (14) 
Let us analyse these two cases: 
• A real adverse shock occurs ( at time (t), for instance)and the Government decides to  
abandon the fixed exchange rates. 
Under flexible regimes, the nominal exchange rate depreciates and the nominal depreciation is 
equal to the increase in prices of the non tradable goods under fixed rates (that is the inverse of 
the real depreciation). Under these circumstances, on the one hand, banks have to raise more 
resources, in domestic terms, in order to pay out its creditors. On the other hand, the real sector 
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is not affected by the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency and the price of non 
tradable goods remains at its level before depreciation. 
• A real adverse shock occurs and  the Government decides to defend fixed exchange  
rates. The decline in the price of tradable goods in terms of non tradable goods leads to 
competitiveness losses in foreign trade and thus affects the revenues of exporting firms (of the 
tradable sector). 
We look for the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game involving the following players:  
• the foreign lenders, who have two strategies available at t = 0 namely {foreign currency 
denominated loan; domestic currency denominated loan}; 
• the domestic bank which announces, at t = 0, the depositors future payments according 
to their maturity; 
• the Government which has two strategies available at t = 1, following the adverse shock 
on the terms of trade, namely {devaluate the nominal exchange rate; defend the peg}; 
• the Nature, playing during the first period. As a consequence, the price of non tradable 
goods is beyond the equilibrium level (1) with a probability of π, which requires a nominal 
devaluation in order to re establish the equilibrium of the real exchange rate.  
 Let us reason by backward induction. The government plays last and decides to 
devaluate the nominal exchange rate whenever the price of non tradable goods is above pN*. We 
denote by ψ  the probability of a nominal devaluation of the domestic currency, in the aftermath 
of the adverse shock, where ψ = P (e >1/ pN >1). 
Furthermore, we can identify two cases, namely: 
! Np~ = pN  > pN * >1→ the government takes the decision to devaluate the nominal exchange 
rate ( with a probability of ψ ) ; 
! Np~ = pN , where 1 < pN   < pN * the government defends the peg  following the adverse shock 
(with a probability of 1-ψ ).  
The probability of a nominal devaluation can be computed as follows: 
 ψ = P ( 





−⋅
Λ
+<−=





−⋅
Λ
+>=>
)(
p~P
)(
p~P*)pp~ NNNN χξχξ 1
11
1
1                  (15) 
   ψ = 





−⋅
Λ
+−
)(
F
χξ 1
11                                                                                   (16) 
Since the random variable Np~  follows a uniform probability distribution on [1, a]
8, its repartition 
function can thus be written as F(x) = 
1
1
−
−
a
x  for x ∈ [1, a] and the previous relation thus become: 
  ψ  9= 
)a()( 11
1
−⋅−⋅
Λ
−
χξ
                                                                               (17)                     
                                                
8 This hypothesis implies that pN   may take any value on [1, a] with the same chance of realisation.   
9 Example : Suppose that a = 3 (that is the upper bound of non tradable goods) , ξ = 0,7 (that is the 
coefficient of inflation in the government loss function),  χ = 0,5 (the weight of the tradable sector in the 
economy) and Λ = 0,55 (that is the credibility cost borne by the government in case of nominal 
devaluation). The probability of nominal devaluation following an adverse shock on the terms of trade 
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provided the necessary condition:    
   Λ< ξ(1-χ)(1-a)                                                                                                   (18) 
In turn, the foreign lenders choose the currency composition of their lending according to their 
anticipations of nominal devaluation of the domestic currency. The expected payoffs of 
depositors are given in the table 2 below:  
Foreign lenders π = P ( Np~ > 1)  
real appreciation  D* (foreign currency loan) D (domestic currency loan) 
Nominal devaluation  
(with probabilityψ) 
Nominal exchange rate risk 
)e~(E/rr~ DD =  
Default risk of the domestic bank 
( )))e~((Err~ b*D*D φ−= 1  
 
 
Government 
 
Defence of the peg 
(with probability  (1-ψ)) 
DD rr~ =  *D*D rr~ =  
1 - π = P ( Np~ < 1)  
real depreciation 
DD rr~ =  
 
Deflation risk in the non tradable 
sector  *D*D rr~ =  
Table 2 
where e~ and b
~φ  are random variables indicating respectively the nominal exchange risk 
undergone, in case of devaluation, by the depositor who lends in domestic currency (the real 
exchange rate variation is thus offset by that of the nominal exchange rate) and the credit risk 
whenever the domestic bank become insolvent as a consequence of the nominal devaluation of 
the domestic currency.  
Result 3 : Foreign lenders lend in foreign currency (D*) whenever the expected default risk of 
the debtor is lower than the expected exchange rate risk, following an adverse shock on the 
terms of trade.  
The above result implies that: 
 ( ) +⋅⋅>⋅−+−⋅⋅+⋅−⋅ ψππψπψφπ
)e~(E
rr)()(r))e(E(r D*D*Db*D 111                    
 DD r)()(r ⋅−+−⋅⋅ πψπ 11                                                                                             (18)                       
and finally 
  
e
e)(    
e
)( ee
∆
<⇔>− εφεφ 11                                                                             (19) 
In other words, foreign lenders choose D* whenever the default cost following a possible 
nominal devaluation is underestimated regarding to the perception of the exchange rate risk.   
 The maturity mismatch was often encouraged by domestic governments, especially 
during the Asian crisis, through implicit guarantees on foreign currency denominated liabilities, 
or through mechanisms10 which facilitated foreign bank lending to domestic financial 
institutions or also through controls on the internal use of the domestic currency. Furthermore, 
the defence of fixed parity by the Government played an important part in the liability 
                                                                                                                                                      
(so that  pN  goes beyond unity which represents the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate) can be 
computed as follows: 
 ψ = 1- .,
)(),(,
,
)a()(
210
1350170
5501
11
=
−⋅−⋅
−=
−⋅−⋅
Λ
χξ
 
10 As the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in Thailand.  
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dollarization of balance sheets in emerging countries. This was usually achieved through 
sterilization of foreign capital inflows in order to control the monetary base and to prevent 
inflation and the real appreciation of the domestic currency. Sterilization is often difficult to 
achieve and, successful or not, it is likely to increase domestic interest rates and attract even 
more capital inflows. 
 
 5. The choice of maturity and currency composition of debt 
 
 The previous analysis put into light, on the one hand, that foreign currency denominated 
debt enable depositors to avoid exchange rate risk but, at the same time, expose them to the 
default risk of the banking sector and/or of the private sector, following an adverse shock.   
On the other hand, according to the result of the third section, depositors could avoid 
credit risk (in connection with the contract renegotiation by the domestic bank) by means of 
demandable debt. The option of early withdrawal of demandable debt may partially or totally 
offset the default risk linked to the nominal devaluation.  
   The couples of maturity and currency as well as the underlying risks are summarized in 
table 3 below: 
 D* (foreign currency loan) D (domestic currency loan) 
ST -neither exchange rate risk nor credit risk 
linked to contract renegotiation; 
-default risk induced by the nominal 
devaluation (balance sheet effects) )e~(bφ . 
- no credit risk linked to contract 
renegotiation; 
- exchange rate risk  in case of 
nominal devaluation ( e~ ). 
 
 
LT 
 
 
- credit risk linked to contract 
renegotiation )~( µ  ; 
- default risk induced by the nominal 
devaluation (balance sheet effects) )e~(bφ . 
- credit risk linked to contract 
renegotiation; 
- exchange rate risk  in case of 
nominal devaluation ( e~ ). 
Table 3 
Let us write the lenders payoffs in each specific case according to the underlying risks (table 4). 
 D* (foreign currency loan) D (domestic currency loan) 
 
ST 
 
*Dr (1- ))e~('(E bφ ) )e~(E
rD  
 
LT 
 
*Dr (1-E ( )e~(bφ ))(1- µ )=  r (1-
E( )e~(bφ ))  
 
)e~(E
rD (1- µ ) = 
)e~(E
r  
Table  4 
where µ denotes the part of long term incomes of foreign lenders retained by the bank following 
the contract renegotiation at t = 1 and (1- )e~('bφ ) denotes the default risk connected to the 
nominal devaluation. The default risk is partially or totally offset by the short maturity of the 
loan (where )e~('bφ < )e~(bφ  that is balance sheet effects affects more the senior debt that the 
junior one in case of nominal devaluation) 
We look for the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game involving the following players:  
• the foreign lenders, who have two strategies available at t = 0 namely {short term  
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foreign currency denominated loan (ST*); short term domestic currency denominated loan (ST); 
long term foreign currency denominated loan (LT*); long term domestic currency denominated 
loan (ST)} and {withdraw; not withdraw} at t= 1; 
• the domestic bank which announces, at t = 0, the depositors future payments according  
to the maturity and the currency denomination of loans and has two strategies available at t = 1, 
namely {renegotiate debt contracts; respect debt contracts}; 
• the Government which has two strategies available at t = 1, following the adverse shock  
on the terms of trade, namely {devaluate the nominal exchange rate; defend the peg}; 
• the Nature, playing during the first period. As a consequence, the price of non tradable  
goods is beyond the equilibrium level (1) with a probability of π, which requires a nominal 
devaluation in order to re establish the equilibrium of the real exchange rate.  
 The order of the game decisions is illustrated below: 
  
 Let us reason by backward induction. Foreign depositors play last and choose to 
withdraw or not to withdraw the invested funds according to the expected payments at each 
period. Apart from the poor enforceability of contracts, they also take into account the default 
risk triggered by a nominal devaluation (in the case of foreign currency denominated debt) and 
alternatively, the exchange risk affecting the domestic currency denominated debt. Their 
withdrawal may be motivated either by the anticipation of a nominal devaluation or by the 
perspective of contract renegotiation by the bank.  
 In turn, the bank proposes, at t = 1, new cash flows to depositors willing to wait for two 
periods, according to their expected behaviour. As shown in the second section, in the case of 
demandable debt, the bank gives up contract renegotiation, whereas it alters the revenues of long 
term depositors (their income at the second period being fixed to r).  
  The government decides to devaluate the nominal exchange rate according to the 
expected consequences of his decision on the real economy and particularly on the 
competitiveness of the tradable sector. Devaluation occurs whenever the price of non tradable 
goods overpasses pN* (as computed in the previous section). 
t = 0                    t = 1                            t = 2 
 
 
-  The lenders choose                                   - The Government decides       (second   
between ST, ST*, LT et LT*      adverse                    to devaluate according to      period payoffs) 
 according to the expected          demand  shock        the expected consequences    
nominal exchange rate;               leading to                of the real adverse choc on  
- The domestic bank                    a real                       firms in tradable and non                
announces the lenders future       appreciation of        tradable sectors; 
payments according to their        the currency  with    - The bank renegotiates the  
maturity and currency                 a  probability            debt contracts and modifies  
denomination;                             of π                          the future payments of  long  
- the real exchange rate is                                             term depositors; 
at equilibrium, that is ε = 1.                                          - Possible withdrawal of depositors; 
                                                                                     (first period payoffs) 
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 Finally, at t = 0, the foreign lenders choose the maturity as well as the currency 
composition of their loans to the domestic bank according to their anticipations of nominal 
devaluation and domestic bank behaviour at t = 1.  
 Suppose a representative lender who has to choose, at t = 0, among ST*, ST, LT* and 
LT. The project liquidation value is R(1-α)+rα . Should a nominal devaluation occurs (with a 
probability of ψ ), the lender withdraws his money at t = 1. From the bank point of view, the due 
payment is e, in the case of ST* and 1, in the case of ST. The lender expected payoffs according 
to the probability of devaluation, the loan maturity and the currency composition are given in 
the table 5 below: 
 D* (foreign currency loan) D (domestic currency loan) 
 
ST 
 
( ) +⋅+⋅⋅⋅ e ;r )-R(1  Min
e
ααπψ 1
 
11 ⋅⋅−+ )( πψ  
 
111 ⋅⋅Ψ−+⋅⋅Ψ )(
e
ππ  
 
LT 
 
r)(
e
r
⋅⋅Ψ−+⋅⋅Ψ ππ 1  
 
r)(
e
r
⋅⋅Ψ−+⋅⋅Ψ ππ 1  
Table 5 
where π  represents the objective probability of an adverse shock triggering a real appreciation 
of the domestic currency and ψ  the probability of a nominal devaluation following the adverse 
shock.   
For e >1 (that is nominal depreciation), short term foreign currency denominated debt dominates 
the other couples of maturity and currency as R (1- α) +rα >1 and r < 1.    
  It follows that, from the point of view of the foreign lender, it is optimal to choose the 
short term foreign currency denominated debt because, in this way, he offsets the default risk by 
the option of early withdrawal provided by the demandable debt. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 In spite of the divergence of views on the origins and nature of international financial 
crises, there is yet an aggravating factor on which economists generally agree, namely the short 
term currency denominated debt. This form of financing may lead to serious maturity and 
currency mismatches in bank balance sheets of emerging countries. Such unbalances create a 
sort of financial fragility of the domestic private sector and expose it to self-fulfilment 
confidence crises by foreign investors. 
 The present paper could be embedded in the recent analytical literature founded on 
endogenous currency composition and financial structure of liabilities (Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee (2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000, 2001 b), Calvo (1998), Diamond and 
Rajan (2000, 01), Jeanne (1999 (a,b),2000), Schneider and Tornell (1999), Schneider and 
Westermann (2002)). These authors aim at explaining why short term foreign denominated debt 
is chosen at the equilibrium of the credit market game.  
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 Regarding the maturity mismatch, we showed that there was a major difference between 
a bank bargaining with creditors having ordinary debt and a bank bargaining with the demand 
depositors. Whenever the bank attempts to renegotiate the contract at an intermediary stage or 
take any other decision against the demand depositors interests, demand depositors may trigger 
a bank run which puts the banks outside the intermediation relationship and drives its rents to 
zero. This threat disciplines the financial intermediary and serves as a commitment device in 
order to protect investors interest. 
 As for the currency mismatch, it results from the choice of foreign lenders whose 
anticipations of exchange rate risk overpass those of default of the banking and/or private sector 
following a real adverse shock.   
 Short term foreign currency denominated debt allows investors to offset the credit risk 
by the option of withdraw at any moment and prior to other lenders, option offered by the short 
maturity of their claims.  
 The conjunction of these two mismatches in a context of financial liberalization and poor 
regulation may lead to a cumulative endogenous process of real appreciation, indebtedness and 
investment in the emerging country. Whenever an adverse real shock occurs, the same 
cumulative process takes place in the opposite way until the Government decides to put an end 
to deflation and let the currency float. Domestic balance sheets serve as propagation mechanism, 
in presence of liability dollarization, of the recessionary effects of the nominal depreciation on 
the emerging economy. 
 The market failure could be avoided if Government could credibly commit itself towards 
the foreign lenders and conclude a contract with them in a coordinate way. As suggested by 
Tirole (2002), an international institution could play the role of a delegated monitor at the 
international level in order to offset the lacking contract between the domestic Government and 
foreign lenders. In this way, emerging countries could better benefit from their financial 
liberalization.  
 The intervention of this supplementary actor as well as the opportunity of different 
measures proposed in the context of the debate on the international financial architecture (capital 
controls, international lender of last resort, etc) are subject of our future research.  
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